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Whether labeled sustainable, responsible, or ESG investing, sustainable investing is
growing into its moment, with pensions and other institutional investors playing important roles.
Although once quite separate, environmental, social, and governance (ESG) concerns are
converging, as pensions and other investors increasingly treat these strands as three parts of a
whole. In addition, once quite separate, sustainability considerations are also being increasingly
integrated into institutions’ overall investment processes.
In our view, convergence and integration are becoming irreversible trends, as pensions and
institutional investors around the world expand their sustainable investing capabilities or require
their managers to do so. Several suggestive indicators include the following:
•

In 2006, 63 asset owners, managers and service providers around the world, representing
about US$6.5 trillion, signed on to the UN’s first Principles of Responsible Investment
(PRI). In 2021, the UN PRI had over 4,000 signatories, of which over 300 are asset owners
or managers representing about US$100 trillion (UN PRI 2021a). Another estimate puts
actual sustainably-managed global assets at about US$40 trillion (Opima 2020). 1

•

In 1995, US institutions managed about $2 billion using a variety of E, S and G criteria,
whereas by 2020, ESG AUM in the US had grown to over $17 trillion, a compound annual
growth rate of about 14 percent (US SIF 2020).

•

Japan’s GPIF, with over US$1.5 trillion AUM, is now requiring its fund managers to
integrate environmental and social concerns into security selection (GPIF 2020).

•

The European Union has been engaged in a multiyear program to increase ESG disclosure
by public companies, and to require institutional investors to incorporate sustainable
investing principles and practices into their investment programs (EC 2018b).
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•

In the US, CalPERS, the California public employee defined benefit plan, has long been a
leader in ESG convergence and integration; and TIAA, an early innovator among defined
contribution plans with separate social choice funds and a strong governance program, is
considering how to bring sustainable investing criteria to bear on its entire investment
portfolio.

•

Among asset managers, BlackRock announced in 2020 that it is in the process of
reorienting its entire $7 billion plus investment portfolio to incorporate sustainable
investment criteria, while Capital Group has integrated ESG-based securities analysis into
its investments. Many other asset managers preceded those actions or are following suit
(Williamson 2020).

Four Forces Driving Convergence and Integration
Next, we identify four forces behind these trends toward convergence and integration in
sustainable investing.
Economic transformation, movements, and organizations. Social movements and government
programs intended to ameliorate the worst of the effects of industrialization are well-known and
long recognized. In the last few decades, reemergence of wealth and income inequality, increasing
industrial concentration and globalization, identification of climate change, and other
environmental and social effects have stimulated regional and global movements and independent
organizations to advocate and pressure government regulators and companies to address negative
consequences.
Information and analysis. Better data and research on environmental and social issues, including
increased disclosure by companies, have enabled governments, independent organizations and
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shareholders to understand the case for companies to act on ESG considerations. This has also
enabled the creation of multiple measurement systems for evaluating companies according to ESG
criteria.
Institutional ownership. Pension and mutual fund ownership of public securities grew severalfold over the last several decades, so that by 2020, pensions accounted for over 60 percent of the
US$ 20 trillion in assets among the world’s top 100 asset owners (Hall et al. 2020). Sovereign
wealth funds accounted for most of the rest. Recognizing the growing size of institutional holdings,
pension participants, mutual fund investors, and governments began increasingly to pressure those
institutions to engage with the companies they own.
Stakeholder, rather than simply shareholder orientation. While the legitimacy of a stakeholder
view of corporate responsibility varies by country and region, wider acceptance of a broad
definition of stakeholders to include all of those affected by company actions has been growing.
This is true both in the US, where by the late 20th century a narrow shareholder view dominated,
and in Europe, where employees in many EU countries have long been recognized as legitimate
stakeholders.
These forces have contributed to a more comprehensive approach by institutions to ESG
investing across the developed world and, in turn, to changes in the way many companies behave
and report. Yet complete convergence and full integration into the investment process by pensions
and other investors remains incomplete, given numerous environmental, social, and governance
considerations.

Current ESG Challenges for Pensions
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If the trend toward convergence and integration is to continue, it will depend on several
challenges that are actively being addressed and debated.
Goals and objectives. There has been a sea change regarding two basic issues: pensions’ fiduciary
responsibility with respect to sustainability versus investment returns, and companies’
responsibility to shareholders versus broader stakeholders. However, neither issue has, of yet, been
fully resolved.
Analytics. As other papers in this volume illustrate, there is far from universal agreement on how
to define environmental, social, and governance factors. This is important both for what companies
disclose regarding their activities along ESG dimensions, as well as practices for and impacts on
investment analysis of companies. A variety of disclosure standards and measurement systems has
been developed over the past several decades, yet there remains disagreement on what factors to
consider, how to define those factors precisely, and what weight should be given to each factor.
The investment toolbox. Investors are developing their own preferred mix of ESG investment
tools or approaches, including negative screening to exclude certain companies, industries, or
countries; positive screening to include companies, or both. Additionally, many pension managers
seek to identify best-in-class investing within industries; impact investing to further specific ESG
goals; engagement and voting on ESG matters; and integration of ESG factors into the securities
analysis and portfolio construction process. The fastest growing of all approaches is ESG
integration into the investment process (EC 2020c).
Global standards and practices. Pensions and other institutions operate within regional and
global systems, which include a variety of other powerful public and non-government
organizations regulating or advocating sustainability policies and practices, all of which can vary
across countries and regions.

5
Although the trends toward ESG convergence and integration are unmistakable, pensions
and other institutions cannot simply adopt universal goals and standards, common valuation
metrics, and off-the-shelf engagement programs. For example, even with general agreement on
reducing carbon emissions, institutions must still determine by how much and by when which
companies can or will contribute to reductions, and which companies will do so efficiently. In
other words, investors must identify and prioritize their ESG objectives, define specific metrics,
and apply them to security selection, while simultaneously creating and managing sustainability
programs.
This paper traces the evolution of ESG investing as it has evolved into a more, but not
completely integrated, framework. We begin by laying out a conceptual framework based on the
concept of the ‘universal owner,’ whom we define as a long-term global investor in a position to
benefit from evaluating and acting on ESG principles through improvements in corporate
governance, and by reducing harmful externalities. We then document the development of
practical approaches to achieving sustainability that, today, consist of a formidable set of tools
with which to evaluate companies and influence their behavior. We also examine the critical public
policy issues affecting sustainable investing, for example how definitions of fiduciary duty differ
with respect to sustainable investing, and how these in turn affect pensions in different countries
and regions. We also illustrate how frameworks, definitions, tools, and public policies have begun
to converge. We conclude by considering sustainable investing challenges that pensions and other
institutional investors will face in the years ahead.

A Conceptual Framework
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While ESG, sustainable, responsible, and impact investing each have somewhat different
connotations, they all reflect the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI)
‘strategy and practice to incorporate environmental, social and governance factors in investment
decisions and active ownership’ (UN PRI 2021 a,b; UN PRI 2020). While the UN PRI goes on to
list six specific principles, the seeming simplicity of this basic definition that treats environmental,
social, and governance as three parts of a whole raises important questions, such as: how are the
three parts of ESG related; what exactly are the factors that need to be incorporated; who is
responsible for investment decisions; and to whom is the investment decision maker responsible?
Universal owner. Environmental, social, and governance objectives have not always been treated
as an integrated whole. Today what brings them closer together is the concept of the ‘universal
owner,’ a pension or another institution that by intention or requirement invests long-term in
widely diversified holdings throughout the global economy (Urwin 2011), and that can speak with
a unified voice (Clark and Hebb 2004). These institutions must manage total market exposure, for
example, by recognizing that environmental and social costs are unavoidable since they affect the
portfolio through insurance premiums, taxes, inflated input prices, unrest, and instability, which in
turn can generate costs reducing returns for some investments. Examples include environmental
degradation, poverty, pandemics, and many others. Looming over all of this, poor company
governance can lead to short-termism, insufficient attention to pertinent environmental and social
issues, and suboptimal decisions that reduce long-term performance. As we will see, universal
owners have played a major role in patterns and policies for sustainable investing today, acting
both individually and in consortia, including with the UN PRI and independent as well as industry
groups.
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Besides universal owners, other stakeholders may also have an interest in sustainable and
responsible corporate practices. The most influential of these are governments, which, even more
than universal owners, have a long-term stewardship interest in the effects of corporate actions on
society. They also control a variety of tools such as legislation and regulation, to direct and affect
corporate behavior. While governments and universal owners cannot afford to avoid sustainability
issues, individual shareholders may also see an interest, although their influence will be less than
that of governments and universal owners. Finally, corporations can assess their own stances and
take actions to either embrace or avoid sustainability and responsibility (Urwin 2019).
Externalities and agency. To better understand the interests of these actors in ESG investing, it
is helpful to turn to two well-known but fundamental economic concepts: externalities and agency
theory. Simply put, an economic externality is a cost or benefit that accrues to third parties: society,
organizations, or individuals that did not directly agree to incur it. The externality may also affect
how firms (and their shareholders) produce it, but a significant portion of the cost or benefit still
attends to third parties. For instance, a plant’s stationary source air pollution could result in higher
health insurance costs and reduced productivity among its workers, thus affecting profits;
nevertheless, substantial impacts are likely to be felt by many others through air particulates or
climate change. Conversely, a plant that scrubs its emissions will benefit many others who do not
pay directly for the costs of doing so. More generally, an externality occurs when a product or
service's market equilibrium price does not reflect the true costs or benefits of that product or
service for society as a whole. From society’s perspective, then, because resources are
suboptimally allocated, the externality cannot pass the Pareto optimality test and results in a market
failure.
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While it may be in society’s interest to reduce or eliminate externalities, the dilemma is
that when the cost of doing so is borne by one or more firms, they are unlikely to be able to fully
capture related positive benefits (e.g., cleaner air and climate stability). A firm might still spend
the money, hoping that ESG-minded customers and investors will reward it by their willingness
either to pay higher prices for the firm’s goods and services or to purchase its securities. For
example, customers of the US clothing manufacturer, Patagonia, are willing to pay more for its
highly-publicized environmentally friendly cotton-based clothing. In other cases, however, a firm
acting alone is unlikely to reap a return on its actions.
A different approach could be for a group of competitors to all agree on reducing specific
negative externalities. Even if they cannot capture all of the positive effects, they may incur similar
extra costs, so that their relative competitive positions can remain the same. In these cases, trade
associations or standard-setting groups can play a central role.
Yet a different approach is for third parties to step in and pressure firms to act. These may
include regulators charged with stewardship over public goods, consumers able to direct their
purchasing dollars (e.g., boycotts), or pensions and other investors who can pressure company
managements using a variety of tools—carrots and sticks—at shareholders’ disposal. This is where
agency theory comes into play. A conflict or moral hazard arises between a principal—the
shareholder—and the agent—company management—when the two parties have different
interests and asymmetric information; that is, management knows more about the business than do
shareholders (Berle and Means 1967). In such an instance, shareholders cannot directly ensure that
management is always acting in their best interest, particularly when activities that benefit the
principal are costly to the agent, and/or where what the agent does is costly for the principal to
observe. In these cases, there may be suboptimal outcomes—agency costs—that reduce societal
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welfare. The agency problem can get worse when company management acts on behalf of multiple
principals or shareholders, some of whom may not want to share in the cost of monitoring and
enforcing certain company policies and practices, or who may not agree on what those policies
and practices should be.
Agency problems affect pensions and other institutional universal owners. Among other
things, institutional shareholders may be reluctant to act because they receive a fraction of the
benefits resulting from stewardship activities, while having to handle all the costs.
It might seem that the problems of externalities and agency theory are closely related, and
that responsible investing efforts should easily recognize the connection. Those using the
externality lens, as well as those using the agency lens, can both favor incentives such as
shareholder and customer preferences, or regulation to internalize certain negative externalities.
More likely, a narrower view of agency that focuses on shareholders interested primarily in shortterm profits to the exclusion of externalities, will conflict with a broader conception that includes
a wider set of stakeholders interested in addressing externalities. For example, efforts to align
manager and shareholder interests to produce policies that ignore or amplify negative externalities
(e.g., reducing costs by moving jobs to countries that allow sweatshop labor) can be aligned on the
profit question, albeit not in ways that always produce sustainable, responsible outcomes.
Stakeholders versus shareholders. As a US example of this issue, the California Public
Employee Pension System (CalPERS) defines corporate governance as ‘the relationship among
various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations. The Primary
participants are: shareholders; company management…and the board of directors.’ (quoted in
McRitchie 2020, p. 1). By contrast, Milton Friedman laid out the case for a definition of corporate
governance confined almost entirely to a firm’s owners’ return on investment:

10
In a free-enterprise, private-property system, a corporate executive is an employee
of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility to his employers. That
responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which
generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to their
basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical
custom (Friedman 1970: Section SM p. 17).
To Friedman, corporate governance must be evaluated by how it transmits and enforces actions
that maximize monetary returns to shareholders, tempered only by the need to conform to the basic
rules of the society.
There is, however, an alternative and more expansive definition hinted at in the CalPERS
formulation, one exemplified by the Johnson & Johnson Company’s Credo, penned by Robert
Wood Johnson in 1943, recognizing that the company’s activities touch employees, customers,
and communities, as well as shareholders (J&J Credo 1943). In other words, according to this
definition, the J&J Credo makes clear that the company creates externalities which must be
acknowledged and managed. Accordingly, governance should be evaluated by how it serves the
needs of all of these entities, not merely by returns to stockholders. This position also allows for a
consideration of externalities, that is, effects on stakeholders that do not accrue to exclusively to
shareholders or management.
This tension between a shareholder vs. stakeholder conception of corporate governance is
present wherever limited liability corporations exist, but it has had a different flavor across
countries and regions in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and influence of company
management, shareholders, stakeholders, and governments. The varying perspective continues to
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challenge pensions, other institutions, and other shareholders in efforts to improve corporate
governance around the globe.
Recognizing that a focus on externalities and the narrower view of governance can conflict,
it is also possible to separate externality and agency issues. For example, stakeholders primarily
interested in improving societal and environmental outcomes might choose to focus on
mechanisms such as regulation or proxy votes that work directly toward those ends without
directly addressing agency issues. Alternatively, those interested in better aligning shareholder and
management incentives—perhaps in search of higher profits—might focus on governance policies,
such as board independence and firm takeover policies, to the exclusion of concerns about
externalities.
In this vein, a comprehensive way to define the challenge for proponents of responsible
investing requires an effort to gain agreement regarding a broader definition of principals in the
agency problem. In the process, stakeholders affected by a company’s externalities will be
included and then their interests aligned with management, shareholders, and stakeholders, so they
agree on policies to reduce negative externalities and capture positive externalities. This challenge
is a formidable one, and even if the key players could agree on a broader definition of whose
interests a company should serve, there is no universal agreement on how to weight those interests,
that is, how to prioritize externalities and how to address them.
Such challenges have shaped the evolution of ESG investing, and they remain very much
alive today. In the next section, we will see that the modern origins of responsible investing were
grounded in this dilemma and essentially led to separate tracks for efforts to improve governance,
environmental, and social outcomes. For pensions and some other institutional investors,
improving governance, that is, programs and policies to better align management with shareholder
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interests, emerged early on in what might be called the modern era of sustainable investing. As it
did so, better governance proponents did not at first recognize the relevance of environmental and
social concerns to their project. What brought the three tracks closer together was the recognition
of a broader, more encompassing longer-term focused definition of shareholder interests that
includes negative and positive externalities.

Strands and Spheres: ‘Pre-Modern’ to ‘Modern’
Here we are primarily interested in understanding the place of pensions and other
institutions in modern ESG investing, but this requires us to recognize the developments that
brought both pensions and ESG to where they are today. We refer specifically to three observations
about what we might call the ‘pre-modern’ era (roughly prior to the 1980s), as opposed to the
‘modern’ era of ESG policies. First was the absence of pensions in sustainable investing until the
late 20th century, largely because funded pensions were small compared to other institutional and
most individual investors. Thereafter, with rapid asset and participant growth, pensions began to
recognize their emerging status as universal investors with an interest in long-term issues of
sustainability. Second, due to government policies, sustainable investing evolved quite differently
across countries and regions. As governments, pension plans, and others began to recognize that
ESG raises issues are global in nature, policies and practices that varied between countries began
to be reexamined. Third, there was initially very little attention devoted to the environment (E)
strand of ESG, later followed by attempts to treat G separately from S and E. With a growing
recognition that agency and externality issues are highly intertwined, policymakers, pensions, and
other investors began to bring the E, S, and G strands together. In effect, the transition from the
pre-modern to the modern ESG era is one of evolution and convergence.
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The pre-modern era. Some observers group countries with respect to ESG investing exclusively
by each nation’s type of corporate legal system. Yet while legal systems differ, two simple but
powerful drivers of the evolution of sustainability practices in the private sector have been patterns
of stock market ownership, and government involvement in social reform and corporate regulation
across countries and regions.
Prior to the turn of the 20th century, early social reforms benefiting employees and then
consumers began to emerge in developed countries, but they were often the result of pressure from
workers, voters, and advocacy groups with little investor involvement. (See Appendix A for details
on premodern ESG developments in selected countries.)
What investor interest there was centered on what we now call corporate governance, as
corporate control in industrial economies was concentrated in three ways: in monopolistic or
oligopolistic industries; control by wealthy families; and financial institutions. For example, in
some countries, families used pyramidal ownership structures 2 and/or banks used special share
classes and proxy voting to give them effective control. This began to change, but not always in
the direction of greater protections for other shareholders and with differences among countries,
notably in the role of government control. The US, for example, used antitrust policy and
regulation to virtually eliminate family and financial institution control of public companies by the
1940s, but policy still tended to favor the interests of company management over those of
shareholders. By contrast, in most European countries, family and financial institution control was
tolerated for far longer. In addition, in the name of worker and consumer protection, and to
preserve declining industries after World War II, some European governments took direct
ownership of companies in certain industries and/or exerted a stronger role in capital allocation.
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We also note that environmental issues played a back seat to governance and social concerns, or
were often nonexistent, until the 1960s and 70s.
At the dawn of the modern era of ESG investing, the landscape looked as depicted in Table
1. Here we see that several of the tools and approaches used to promote good corporate governance
in the modern era were already in use but not widespread, including the 2-tier board structure, a
degree of uniform accounting and disclosure, limits on institutional and family ownership, antimonopoly enforcement, and formal recognition of stakeholders. Others approaches, such as
shareholder initiatives, prohibition of interlocking directorates, independent board members, etc.,
were scarce or missing.
Table 1 here
There was a long history of employee and consumer protections regarding social and
environmental issues in many countries, but the impetus rarely came from shareholders. Rather,
most often it arose from union activism and other interest groups leading to government regulation
and/or ownership of industry. For example, the US government created a wave of regulatory
agencies at the start of the 20th century. Pensions were not in a position to exercise much influence
in those days, since in many countries they were either unfunded public entities or, as in the UK
and the US, they were funded but had not yet accumulated substantial financial clout.
The modern era. What we call the modern era of ESG investing began in the late 1970s and early
1980s, marked by the rise of pension ownership, the retreat of direct government ownership of
companies, and separate movements to promote corporate governance and environmental reforms.
For example, in 1969, the US Environmental Protection Agency was created, exemplifying a new
era of government regulation in response to environmental activism; this was later followed by
similar programs in other countries.
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The establishment of funded pensions earlier in the 20th century, particularly in the US, the
UK, the Netherlands, and later in Australia, meant that by the 1980s these had become substantial
asset owners, along with sovereign wealth funds. In addition, a small number of asset managers
joined asset owners in controlling a growing percentage of public company shares. While these
trends were far from identical across industrial countries, and the assets under management appear
small from today’s vantage point, the largest institutions could even then be considered universal
owners who had no choice but to purchase shares in most public companies in search of capital
appreciation and income for their beneficiaries.
The result of these shifts in stock ownership patterns can be observed in Figure 1.
Institutional investors, which include pensions, other asset owners, and asset managers who work,
in part, for asset owners, now own over 70 percent of outstanding shares in the US, with similar
percentages in the Netherlands, the UK, and Canada. By contrast, institutional investors own less
than 40 percent of public shares in other European countries, about one-third in Japan, and less
than 10 percent in China. Corporate cross holdings, which are high in Asia, are quite low in Europe
and the US. In addition, in countries such as Norway and Japan, government agencies directly
invested pension savings in the stock market, while in others such as China, governments took
direct ownership of companies. (The Figure does not reflect the legacy and continuation of
pyramidal ownership and share class structures in Asia and Europe.)
Figure 1 here
Given these patterns, it is not surprising that interest in ESG investing issues emerged
among pension plan managers. This occurred slowly, evolving with different patterns across
institutions, countries, and the three strands of sustainability: environmental, social, and
governance.
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Governance
Pensions. Several leading US pensions, such as TIAA, CalPERS, and other institutional investors,
were instrumental in the corporate government movement of the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to
their growing asset bases, these institutions were operating with the legacy of pre-WWII reforms
that favored company management over other stakeholders, a rising stock market, and an
accompanying wave of mergers. For example, management-controlled boards, limited disclosure,
opaque shareholder initiative processes, and other measures all enabled managers to operate with
little scrutiny. Although there was a dearth of concrete evidence available, institutional investors
began to respond to the view that it was in their interest to propose and/or support policies that
would shift the balance of power toward shareholders and away from management.
No two pensions (or other institutional investors) pioneered identical approaches to
corporate governance programs. For example, CalPERS tended to employ public statements aimed
at changing corporate behavior, while TIAA more often used direct and relatively more private
communications with company management. Nevertheless, these and other programs largely
shared four elements: a legal orientation; similar, though not identical, reform proposals; crossfertilization with investment managers; and separation from environmental and social concerns.
Conceptually, corporate governance reform was, for the most part, viewed through a legal rather
than a financial or economic lens, meaning that problems and solutions were more likely to be
evaluated by whether they conformed to a set of preferred principles such as a definition of board
independence, or a process such as a streamlined shareholder initiative process. Economic impacts,
such as increased shareholder returns, were mostly ignored, or they were assumed to follow from
the implementation of corporate governance initiatives. Organizationally, new corporate
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governance units were, for the most part, housed in the legal departments of institutional investors.
For pensions as well as corporate governance service providers, these units were led by experts
with a legal background.
In keeping with this focus on principles and process, many pension managers could agree
on the need for assistance. TIAA, CalPERS, CalSTRS, and others were co-founders of the
Institutional Investor Responsibility Center (IRRC) in 1972, which sought to aid investors in
understanding corporate governance issues. as Along with international pensions, these entities
were also among the founders of the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), which assisted with
proxy voting, regulatory advocacy and other activities (see Table 2). These and other research,
service, and advocacy programs helped pensions and other institutional investors further the
following policies: greater independence of board members, separate audit and compensation
committees, changes in executive compensation, removal of poison pill provisions, support for the
shareholder initiative process, regular proxy voting, and various forms of engagement.
Table 2 here
In terms of cross-fertilization, although corporate governance programs were not generally
housed in investment departments, organizations that directly managed corporate governance staff
could learn from investment analysts and managers knowledgeable about the management,
governance structure, and processes of the companies they covered. This, in turn, enabled them to
recommend companies that might benefit from certain reforms. Likewise, investment analysts and
managers could incorporate into their investment decisions information about initiatives being
proposed by corporate governance staff (see Table 3).
Table 3 here
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Moving ahead in time, but still prior to the 2010s, corporate governance programs rarely
considered environmental or social issues to be part of their universe. Their legal orientation may
have made it difficult to incorporate these relatively more outcome-oriented issues. Also, some
activists considered corporate governance reform to be fundamental, while other issues were often
seen as derivative. In other words, establishing good governance practices was intended to lead
companies to evaluate and treat all externalities properly.
Corporate governance organizations. One cannot understand the emergence of activism among
large institutional investors such as TIAA and CalPERS without noting the crucial role played by
independent corporate governance service organizations. In the US, investors and companies for
many years had been able to turn to business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, the
Business Roundtable, and, for fund companies, the Investment Company Institute, for informed
views on corporate structure and process. In turn, these often supported company management
over shareholders.
Beginning in the 1970s, several new service organizations were established that played
various advisory and advocacy roles oriented to institutional investor interests. The IRRC sought
to provide independent, impartial research on proxy voting, corporate governance, and corporate
social responsibility issues (Weinberg Center 2021). 3 Another independent organization, the
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD), was established in 1977 to train and set
standards for board directors (see Table 4).
Table 4 here
In 1985, during a period of heightened corporate mergers, the Council of Institutional
Investors began an effort to pool resources in exercising shareholder oversight through proxy
voting, shareowner resolutions, pressure on regulators, discussions with companies, and litigation.

19
Membership today includes 140 US public, union, and corporate employee benefit plans,
endowments, and foundations, with combined assets under management of approximately
$4 trillion. Associate members include non-US asset owners with more than $4 trillion, and US
and non-US asset managers with over $35 trillion in AUM (CII 2021). Around the same time, the
Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS) group began to advise institutional shareholders
(including mutual and hedge funds) on proxy voting and, when requested, to vote their shares. The
firm later acquired the IRRC and was in turn sold to MSCI. On the international front, the
International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN), started in 1995, was created to promote
dialogue and education regarding governance and stewardship practices. Its members, drawn from
over 45 countries primarily in North America and Europe, include pensions, asset managers, public
companies, and advisory firms (ICGN 2021).
Institutional investors differed in how they used these corporate governance resources.
Some relied on organizations such as ISS to research and form positions, as well as to vote their
shares. Many mutual fund companies, by contrast, refrained from active or intense participation in
corporate governance issues and shareholder voting. Others relied on external research by the
IRRC, CII, and other organizations, after which they developed their own corporate governance
positions and programs.
While the world of corporate governance only gradually started to recognize its
connections with environmental and social issues in the late 1980s, these two strands of sustainable
investing also began to develop in the modern era.

Environmental and Social Issues
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As with governance, investor concerns for social and environmental topics evolved over
time into what is now often treated under the banner of socially responsible investing (or SRI). A
stakeholder orientation provides the foundation for social and environmental investing, on the
basis that companies’ activities affect not only shareholder returns, but also communities,
employees, customers, and the environment, implying that these latter interests should also have a
voice in company activities. At first, environmental and social initiatives focused on three
approaches: shareholder activism, community investing, and guideline investing. Of the three,
social investing emphasized shareholder activism and community investing, while environmental
investing emphasized both shareholder activism and guideline investing. Nevertheless, as time
went on, all three strategies became important for both environmental and social concerns.
Shareholder activism. For pension plans required to act as fiduciaries, an initial avenue for
shareholders to gain clout was to exert influence on companies identified as ‘doing harm’ with
their products, or where they were doing business (e.g., South Africa). This took the form of
informal and formal engagement with companies, including communications, and, in some cases,
formal shareholder initiatives. In the US and in other countries, a recurring theme was the role of
government vis-à-vis stakeholders and companies. Governments can spend to improve social and
environmental conditions, and they can also direct companies to do so as well. Accordingly,
stakeholders could pressure government, public, and private pensions and other asset owners to
push companies to act, in turn. In that vein, SEC rules regarding shareholders’ standing and shifting
guidance on what constituted fiduciary duty, all helped to shape pension activism.4
Apartheid in South Africa was also an early defining social issue. In 1977, the Sullivan
Principles became a voluntary code of conduct for companies operating in that country. In this
spirit, in 1978, TIAA issued its own statement on companies doing business in South Africa, and
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in 1983 it fully divested from these assets. Other investors followed suit. Additional instances of
global activism included, in the 1980s, actions against Procter & Gamble and Philip Morris for
their involvement in El Salvador in the 1980s, and, beginning in the 1990s, wages, working
conditions, and child labor in companies with factories operated outside the US.
These initiatives fueled a formal corporate social responsibility (CSR) movement that
helped alter companies’ expectations regarding their responsibility to internalize the effects
(externalities) of their supply chains. The CSR movement resulted in greater demand by direct
investors and other stakeholders for improved reporting, including both S and E. For example,
CERES (the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies), established as a response to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster of 1989, took a more comprehensive view of sustainability
reporting. In turn, this led to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) program in 1997 (with Tellus
Institute and the UN Environment Programme). The GRI would eventually become an independent
organization in 2001, with headquarters in Amsterdam (GRI 2021). Beginning with the Valdez
disaster, state pensions such as New York, CalPERS, and CalSTRS became increasingly active in
designing and supporting these organizations.
During the 1990s, US pensions began to recognize the need to apply additional lenses to
their portfolios, mainly through proxy voting and engaging with companies of concern. They also
felt growing pressure from participants and other constituencies to use more E and S information
to exclude portfolio holdings. To that end, pensions began to develop their ability to create and
manage ESG portfolios.
Guideline investing. This approach began in the 1970s by fund managers Calvert, Dreyfus, and
Pax World, and it was used by investors to exclude tobacco, alcohol, weapons, and other products
or activities poorly aligned with ethical or faith values. Later, guideline investing expanded to
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impose systematic negative screening, positive screening, and best-within-a-sector (best-in-class)
security selection. Pensions as well as asset managers were active in these developments, including
TIAA, CalPERS, CalSTRS and others.
As the approach evolved, tension emerged between those using segregated funds versus
applying ESG criteria to security selection and portfolio construction. For example, TIAA, which
created the TIAA-CREF Social Choice Account as one among many investment options for
participants in 1990, faced continuing participant pressure to eliminate tobacco and other products
from all funds, not just the Social Choice Account. Moreover, among institutional investors, there
was also no general agreement on how to select securities. The question that managers then faced
was whether they should select companies in which to invest on an absolute basis, or instead to
select the best companies within an industry or sector.
A related problem was that, while there might be agreement on certain issues such as
tobacco, there was far less agreement on what exactly constituted ESG objectives. Part of this
conundrum was due to the lack of data and analysis to provide a foundation for investment
decisions. For example, in 1986 when the US Environmental Protection Agency required the first
toxic release reports, that system focused on facilities rather than companies, making it difficult
for investors to use the information for portfolio selection. In many cases, the early research
providers serving institutional investors did not make raw data available, but rather they interpreted
ratings and assessments. In retrospect, this may have harmed the cause more than it helped, because
institutions first needed to unlock ‘black box’ methodologies, and later to determine how the
information should inform investment decisions. In turn, this led to initiatives such as the GRI, to
develop better reporting and measurement systems, along with efforts to define and reach
agreement among investors and others on ESG objectives. While the establishment of the
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 was not primarily investor-driven, its
periodic assessment reports did help shape investor understanding of how company and industry
actions affected climate degradation and the resulting investment risk.
Community investing or economically targeted investment (ETI) was the precursor to today’s
impact investing, developed to generate particular social outcomes alongside financial return. This
strategy was based on the belief that ‘the plight of the homelessness and joblessness cannot be
“fixed” through conventional Wall Street investments,’ but instead required involvement by credit
unions, foundations, community-based revolving funds, worker cooperatives, and other entities
(Domini et al. 1992, p. 3). Another impetus was provided by the federal Community Reinvestment
Act of 1977, which required the Federal Reserve and other federal banking regulators to
‘encourage’ financial institutions to help meet the credit needs of the communities in which they
did business, including with loans and direct investments. Organizations such as the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) were formed to work with financial institutions to channel
funds into local projects; pensions and other institutional investors were also encouraged to
participate.
Nevertheless, for pensions, challenges to community investing included the need to
develop appropriate investment vehicles, gain scale, develop return expectations, and, for ERISA
plans, shift DOL guidance on fiduciary duty regarding what constituted responsible lending
practices. Alliances with Shorebank and other community banks, as well as the Local Initiatives
Support Corporation, and the launch of Impact Community Capital (1998) founded by TIAA and
seven other insurance companies, all provided solutions, particularly for low-income housing
initiatives. In addition, activism played a role, as shareholders pressured banks on practices that
harmed vulnerable customers via predatory lending and redlining practices.
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Pension and other institutional involvement in community investing took a more global
turn in the 1990s and 2000s, with attention to microfinance and the broader concept of financial
inclusion. The term ‘impact investing’ was first coined in 2007, and it gained traction through the
launch and fieldwork of the Global Impact Investing Network which included foundations and
pensions in different countries. The initial focus was on private equity, with a concern for specific
goals and outcomes that depended, for credibility, on advances in ESG-related measurement.
Impact investing has more recently gained traction in other classes.

Bringing the Three Strands Together
The years around the turn of the 20th century also saw growing acceptance among pensions,
other investors, and activists that environmental, social, and governance issues are intertwined and
mutually reinforcing. On the one hand, investors, regulators, and independent organizations
increasingly recognized that progress on corporate environmental and social concerns would only
be successful if they were supported by governance reforms. On the other hand, they also saw that
the next steps in corporate governance reform would likely lead to a discussion of environmental
and social reforms. To illustrate these trends, several earlier events were arguably treated
contemporaneously as primarily social (South Africa divestment) or environmental problems (the
Union Carbide plant in Bhopal and the Exxon Valdez disasters) that did not involve the central
concerns of corporate governance. Looking back on those events, we can now see that corporate
decision making and governance were not only intertwined with these issues, but that changes in
one were needed to produce improvements in the others.
Leading the way to integration of ESG was a movement to coordinate E&S activities across
different countries and regions (see Table 5). Principal among these was the consortium of global
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pensions and other institutional investors that, in 2005, pressured the United Nations to sponsor a
20-person group from 12 countries to develop an ESG framework for the investment industry. The
result, first issued in 2006, firmly linked E, S & G together as follows: ‘As institutional investors,
we have a duty to act in the best long-term interests of our beneficiaries. In this fiduciary role, we
believe that environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) issues can affect the
performance of investment portfolios (to varying degrees across companies, sectors, regions, asset
classes and through time). We also recognize that applying these principles may better align
investors with broader objectives of society.’ (UN PRI 2021b, p. 1) (see Table 6).
Tables 5 and 6 here
In addition, a UN-affiliated organization, Principles for Responsible Investment, was
established to put the framework into practice, and it continues to lead integration efforts at a
global level. Initially, PRI reporting requirements for its signatories were not seen as stringent.
Nevertheless, backed by the principles and their own participants, global pensions and other
institutional asset owners could and did increase pressure on investment managers to incorporate
ESG considerations into portfolio decisions. In 2011, the UN PRI increased the specificity of
reporting requirements, further encouraging ESG progress.
While visible and far-reaching, the UN PRI was far from the only group making initiatives
in this period. The EU established a unit with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for
Economic and Financial Affairs to launch a series of studies, consultations, and directives moving
in the direction of requiring institutional investors to consider ESG in the investment process. In
the US, while integration of ESG was far from universal, two trends were evident. One was that
CalPERS, CalSTRS, and TIAA-CREF began to connect their corporate governance units residing
in legal departments more closely with their investment professionals. The second was to more
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closely connect staff tasked with environmental and social research, analysis, and investments,
with the staff responsible for non-ESG oriented investment decisions. In other words, these
organizations took the first steps to integrate ESG with ‘regular’ investing. 5
The trend toward integration, which began in the late 1990s and 2000s, accelerated in the
2010s (see Table 7). Within pensions (again, particularly TIAA-CREF, CalPERS, CalSTRS and
other independent pensions) and other institutional investors, the movement to fully integrate ESG
analysis into investment decisions reached fruition. Near the end of the decade, for example, TIAA
(as it was then called) announced that ESG factors would be considered in all funds and portfolios
across all asset classes (TIAA 2021).
Table 7 here
At the international level, the Paris Agreement of 2015 was a watershed. One of a series of
conventions and projects that originated with the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UN 1992), the Paris Agreement was signed by 195 countries and the EU (though
not the US). It set out a definition of climate change and goals for limiting global warming and
called for action to achieve goals by government and non-government actors (UN 2015). It has
helped galvanize investors and companies to focus attention on sustainable investing and corporate
challenges with respect to climate change, including but not limited to production processes, new
products, and discussions of stranded assets.
At the regional level, in the EU the European Commission (EC) continued to stage a series
of consensus-building consultations and to issue ESG-related rules. Following from reports issues
by the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Standards, the EC began to
focus on ‘prudential measures’ that would integrate ESG risk factors into investments and financial
firm solvency (Ingman 2020). It also developed corporate ‘conduct’ legislation, for example the
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Non-Financial Reporting Directive which required larger EU corporations, starting in 2017, to
disclose data on their firm’s impact on ESG and vice versa (EC 2014). Other examples include
EC’s Action Plan: Financing Sustainable Growth (EC 2018), which clarified institutional
investors’ and asset managers’ duties, incorporated sustainability into the suitability assessment of
financial instruments, and increased transparency of sustainability benchmarks. Similarly, The
European Green Deal (EC 2019b) and The Proposal for a European Climate Law (EC nd) were
intended, among other objectives, to reorient capital flows towards sustainable investment in order
to achieve sustainable and inclusive growth; limit global warming; manage financial risks
stemming from climate change, environmental degradation, and social issues; and foster
transparency and long-termism in financial and economic activity. The European Commission also
examined and made recommendations for government investments, including pensions (EC 2018
a,b).
In addition to these initiatives, there was a near-explosion of similar developments by
independent, industry and quasi-governmental organizations to construct ESG frameworks,
guidelines and standards (see Figure 2). Of the twelve such initiatives in the figure, nine appeared
between 2010 and 2020. It should be noted that while these initiatives reflected growing interest
in ESG investing and integration of ESG, many of them were produced independently from the
others and so contributed to confusion regarding just what investors should consider to be ESG
and how to implement it. In that vein, in this period a number of private data and analytics
providers began or continued major projects to identify, define and measure ESG factors pertinent
to investment risk and return and sell the results to investors, with an increasing emphasis on
integrating these factors into organized ratings systems (see also Lee forthcoming). In addition, a
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number of firms launched or added formal securities indexes that could be used by investors
interested in forming integrated ESG portfolios.
Figure 2 here
Several other indicators give us a picture of ESG growth and integration in this period. In
particular, the left panel of Figure 3 shows the change in US shareholder support for formal
environmental and social proxy proposals, compared to governance and compensation proposals.
In 2010, over 60 percent of governance and compensation proposals, but only 12 percent of
environmental and social proposals, received more than 30 percent of the total votes cast. By 2018,
environmental and social proposals received over 35 percent of the votes cast. The right panel of
Figure 3 also shows the change in support for environmental and social proxy proposals. Median
support rose from about 10 percent in 2010 to just under 25 twenty five percent in 2018. The right
panel also documents the increase of UN PRI institutional signatories from about 60 in 2010 to
over 400 in 2018.
Figure 3 here
The trend toward integration and systematizing ESG is continuing in the 2020s. ESG data
and reporting continue to deepen, with a greater focus on intentional outcomes and impact
measurement. For example, in 2021, the US DOL announced that it intended to return to an earlier
view of the prudent investment rule followed by pensions and other fiduciaries. Specifically,
fiduciaries are now asked to consider all factors that affect investors’ portfolios and financial risks,
including ESG factors (US DOL 2021) (see Table 8).
Table 8 here
In the European Union, the EC has launched a project substantiating ‘green claims,’ with
the intention of reducing ‘greenwashing’ by companies trying to appear to be improving their ESG
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scores but avoiding substantive reforms (EC 2020b). Additional EC initiatives have showcased a
willingness to allow ESG a central role within the legislative process, including a circular economy
action plan (EC 2020a), the food system (EC 2020b), climate (EC 2020c) and additional
disclosures (EC 2019b). Most recently, the EC presented its new Sustainable Finance Package,
intended to help improve the flow of money towards sustainable activities across the European
Union, including proposals for new corporate sustainability reporting and revisions to previous
rules for sustainability reporting and assessments (EC 2021; EC 2020a). Finally, pensions and
other institutional investors have continued to boost commitments to ESG investing. For instance,
the Capital Group (Capital Group 2021), TIAA (2021), The Segal Group (2021), BlackRock
(Williamson 2020), and other asset managers have announced plans to go ‘all-ESG’ and achieve
future carbon neutrality in their investments

Looking Ahead: Challenges for Pensions
Four forces are leading to the convergence of E, S, and G for pension managers, along with
the integration of sustainable considerations into asset owners’ and asset managers’ investment
processes: economic transformation and accompanying social movements; the emergence of
universal owners; stakeholders and small shareholders; and improved information and analysis.
Despite these trends, convergence and integration will remain incomplete for several reasons that
highlight challenges and directions for pensions and other institutions.
Goals and objectives. As we have seen, pension sponsors and their asset managers have
increasingly recognized their roles as representing participants in universal ownership of public
companies. There is less agreement on specific goals and objectives, often summarized as fiduciary
responsibility. One remaining question regards the extent to which sustainability conflicts with
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returns; that is, how does sustainability conform to regulations requiring pensions to invest
prudently on behalf of participants? Reflecting continuing confusion on this issue, the late 2020
US Department of Labor (DOL) requirement that pensions must focus on returns and, by
implication, that ESG considerations reduced returns, was rescinded by a new Administration in
early 2021. We believe that it is likely that the US will eventually follow the European view that
sustainability can affect investment risk, and that proper fiduciary responsibility must balance
sustainability risks with return.
Even with such a resolution, other questions remain, including for example the time
dimension, or how much one should be willing to sacrifice short-term return to achieve long-term
benefits. For example, an institutional investor may believe that a company with good short-term
profit potential is undervalued, but that its long-term prospects are less attractive because of the
nature of its business (e.g., tobacco or fossil fuels). Which is the better strategy: to avoid the
company altogether, or own the company in the short run and determine when to sell it?
A third issue has to do with participant heterogeneity. Pensions and other financial
institutions act for all participants and shareholders, but they need not all agree across all issues.
One participant’s negative, such as owning alcohol distributors or military suppliers, may be
another’s positive, and these differences may reflect both assessments of negative and positive
externalities, as well as emotional positions. In either case, they pose challenges for investment
institutions in setting responsive policies. One interim approach is to focus on ESG issues that gain
wide approval among participants and shareholders, such as we saw in South Africa divestiture,
and currently in long-term policies to reduce exposure to fossil fuels.
A fourth issue is other organizational constraints, including regulatory and other
stakeholder concerns, affecting pension and institutional ownership. One such example is the
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series of EU regulations issued over the past decade under the sustainability banner. On the
stakeholder side, unions, advocacy groups, and others using ownership stakes, shareholder
meetings, and other mechanisms to pressure asset owners and managers are likely to continue
encouraging investment institutions to focus on their preferred goals and objectives. Yet
constraints can also work in the other direction. For instance, in Japan, while the Government
Pension Investment Fund (GPIF) has established environment-oriented investment programs and
criteria, it has not done the same with respect to governance and social issues to date. We speculate
that this may be connected to the interests and views of some of the largest domestic public
companies.
Analytical tools. There is far from universal agreement on how to evaluate environmental, social,
and governance factors important to company disclosure practices, performance standards, and
investment evaluation. For disclosure, governments such as the EU and independent organizations
such as the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) are calling for more and better
standardized company disclosure. Others, such as the International Association of Securities
Regulators (IOSCO), focus on performance standards to determine which activities can be
considered more versus less sustainable (Eccles 2021a). In addition, we note that a wide variety of
metrics have been developed over the past several decades, and these do not always agree on what
factors to consider, how to define those factors precisely, and what weight should be given to each
factor (e.g., Lee forthcoming). On the one hand, a lack of agreement provides opportunities for
one investor with superior resources and skill to do a better job of securities analysis. On the other
hand, analytical heterogeneity can limit or provide conflicting signals to companies as to what is
expected of them regarding sustainable practices. Moreover, the design and choice of a
measurement systems reflects the sponsor’s sustainability goals and objectives, which, as we have
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seen, vary by institution. One can imagine that information users—institutional owners,
government overseers, activists, and others—will eventually be able to agree on disclosure
standards. Nevertheless, the largest universal owners will likely continue to refer to one or more
widely-available ESG measurement approaches, as well as their own proprietary metrics, for
identifying and incorporating ESG considerations in securities analysis and portfolio construction.
Institutional shareholder initiatives. There is also general agreement on the benefits of and
necessity for universal owners to give voice to sustainability improvements in the companies they
own. Nevertheless, there is less agreement on how to do so, and how interventionist to be, ranging
from proxy voting, private communications, and initiating shareholder resolutions, to public
campaigns, lobbying, and lawsuits. TIAA and other institutions have pioneered programs that
operate on all these levels, and more universal owners may use these models as templates for their
own engagement activities.
Global standards and practices. As we have seen, pensions and other financial institutions must
operate within systems that include a variety of other powerful government and non-government
actors. Regional and national regulators, both public (e.g., EU or US DOL) and private (e.g.,
SASB, FASB), are encouraging and/or requiring a consistent approach to accounting and
disclosure, along with other practices that promise to affect sustainable behavior, both by
companies and pensions. Other quasi-government (e.g., UN PRI) and non-governmental
organizations will also, no doubt, continue to be active in promoting sustainability. And policies,
practices, and levels of activism still vary across countries and regions. While international treaties
and organizational initiatives such as the UN PRI have made substantial contributions to increased
consistency, policies and practices are unlikely to completely converge without additional
international-level enforcement, either through peer pressure or actual regulation. Also, an open
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question remains as to who will be the final arbiter of international standards, practices, and
behavior. Some have argued that investors should not be the final arbiter of corporate behavior
(Eccles 2021b).

Implications for Pensions
In sum, while we can see movement toward convergence and integration among pensions
and other institutional investors, there are forces or reasons why these developments are not yet,
nor may not soon, be complete. We close with an assessment of the outstanding questions.
Does further ESG progress require all investors to be on the same page? While pension
investing is increasingly global, pension plans serve participants in specific countries, and in some
cases, occupations or industrial sectors. This diversity of beneficiaries is likely to mean that
specific ESG objectives and motivations will continue to vary. For example, while most appreciate
the implications of global climate change, even there, impacts, concerns, and programs differ
across regions and populations. Accordingly, complete convergence may be impossible or
undesirable.
Similarly, integration of ESG considerations into all investments may be a goal for some
investors, but not for others. The TIAA experience, for example, suggests that some participants
would like 100 percent of their investments to be driven by ESG criteria, while others favor less
weight on ESG criteria. Progress can be achieved in a world with many actors—governments,
pensions, other institutional investors, advocacy groups, etc.—and many tools for advancing ESG.
In fact, such a world can encourage innovation and adaptation, if not always complete
coordination.
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Who will make decisions? As noted above, full national and international convergence is unlikely
regarding ESG disclosure, what data should be evaluated and how, and how to integrate this
information into investment and engagement decisions. Pensions operate in a multilayered system
where multiple public actors at the international, national, and local levels can claim authority over
ESG policies affecting investments. Furthermore, pension participants, other shareholders, and
other stakeholders in both the nonprofit and profit arenas can also claim an interest in investment
decisions, as we saw in the latter half of the 20th century. For instance, one could imagine that as
pension assets continue to grow, particularly in China, the rest of Asia, and Latin America, those
players will increasingly express their views and take action.
Who ‘owns’ the big picture? There is no global ESG regulator, though many entities including
governments and independent agencies all have a voice; they also cooperate as well as compete to
set the ESG framework and guide action. This includes international pension consortia and even
the very largest asset managers (e.g., BlackRock). To date it is unclear whether an effective global
ESG ecosystem is necessary for continued evolution if the investment industry, and if so, who can
direct such an ecosystem?
What is the next unifying issue after climate change? In the modern ESG era, climate change
has been the topic that has generated the most interest and agreement among asset owners,
managers, and other investors. Given that addressing climate change requires committing
resources to analysis, as well as large and sustained public and private action, it will continue to
be the most visible ESG issue for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, other ESG issues may also be candidates for unifying action, including what
is now called economic equality (or inequality). Discussion of the equality issue goes back to the
19th century with concerns about workers, families, and consumers, along with regulation and
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social programs to address these problems. Interest in economic equality has waxed and waned
over the decades, but it has now reemerged with proposals to improve working conditions, raise
children out of poverty, and reduce the nearly unprecedented gap between the rich and the poor
populations. Increasing economic equality is not exclusively a challenge for government and
nonprofit organizations, since companies also play a role through wages and benefits, working
conditions, supply chain design, environmental, and investment policies. For this reason, one can
imagine that proposals and programs to address inequality engage companies in the future.
In any case, while these challenges remain, pensions and other asset owners can benefit
from knowledge and experience gained from the evolution of ESG, deeper analytical and
organizational resources, a more robust set of tools and initiatives, support (and constraints) from
government and non-governmental organizations, and considerably more agreement among
investors on goals and objectives. We anticipate that pensions will need to draw on these resources
to address ESG concerns, both existing and emerging.
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Endnotes
1

According to these estimates, ESG assets under management consist almost entirely of assets

where managers incorporate ESG considerations into the ‘regular’ investment process. A few are
in separate funds and accounts dedicated to ESG.
2

A pyramid ownership structure separates rights to a firm’s cash flows from voting rights. In this

case, a family uses a firm where it has controlling interest to set up one or more firms controlled
by the first company, but with dispersed stock ownership as well. The first firm can capture a large
percentage of the new firms’ revenues but leave any losses at the level of the new firms. In this
way the family can access the entire amount of the retained earnings of the first company, which
can include the captured firms’ revenues.
3

In 2005 the IRRC was sold to Institutional Shareholder Services and the IRRC Institute, a

research center now housed at the University of Delware, was created with the proceeds.
4

In particular, see SEC 17 CFR 240.14a-8 rule governing shareholder proposals. An explanation

can be found from the Legal Information Institute (2021).
5

Based on authors’ interviews with current and former staff of CalPRS, CalSTRS and TIAA-

CREF.
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Figure 1. Total stock market holdings by investor categories across countries, 2017
China
Korea
Norway
France
Italy
Germany
Japan
Sweden
Netherlands
Canada
United Kingdom
United States
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Institutional investors

Private corporations

Strategic individuals

Other free float including retail

70

80

90

100

Public sector

Source: De La Cruz et al. (2019) based on OECD Capital Markets Data Set, Thompson Reuters
and Bloomberg.
Notes:
1. Distribution of total holdings by investor category in each market for the universe of 10,000
largest listed companies. Both domestic and foreign holdings by category are aggregated in
USD as a percentage of total market cap in each market.
2. Assignment of assets to categories follows each country's classifications. For example,
Norway's public sector assets includes those held by the Government Pension Fund of
Norway. Canada's public pension fund assets are classified as institutional holdings.
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Figure 2. Evolution of international ESG frameworks, guidelines, and standards, 1997-2020
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Figure 3. Environmental and social issues join the mainstream among shareholders
A. Percentage of US shareholder proposals receiving > 30% of votes cast

B. Median support for environmental and social shareholder proposals (left scale) and number
of UN PRI signatories in the US (right scale)

Source: Papadopoulos (2019), p. 7 (Fig. 3A) and p. 3 (Fig. 3B).
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Table 1. ESG investing landscape at the dawn of the ‘modern’ era
2-Tier Board Structure (+
worker participation)
Limit institutional ownership
Separate commercial &
investment banking
Government
ownership/direction of certain
Policies
industries
and Tools Formal/legal recognition of
stakeholders
Strong anti-monopoly
enforcement
Corporate
Higher degree of uniform
Governance
accounting, reporting &
disclosure rules
Small shareholder activism
High degree of manager
control/low degree of
shareholder control
Relatively higher use of voting
Continuing
caps, multiple share classes, etc.
Issues
Interlocking directorates
Family or bank control
common*
Takeover defenses
Environmental regulation and
activism
Consumer and worker
Social &
protections
Environmental
Family and individual
protections**
Union activism: negotiation,
lobbying

U.S. U.K. Netherlands Germany France Italy Sweden Japan
X
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Pensions

Growth of funded pension assets
(DB and DC)
Social & environmental
investments

H

H

L

L

H

L

L

L

L

H

Source: Morck (2005); Authors' calculations
Notes: *Family control often exercised through pyramid ownership structures; bank control often exercised by proxy voting or direct ownership
**Health insurance, child support, other family support
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Table 2. ESG in the 1970s
‘ESG as a principle’
• Investors align around key social concerns
(e.g., South Africa, Vietnam War, poverty)
• Forerunning ESG research, and
shareholder advocacy, and community
development institutions are founded

Source: Authors’ calculations

Key Institutional developments
• Council on Economic Priorities / CEP
(1969)
• Pax World Fund (1971)
• Dreyfus Third Century Fund (1972)
• Interfaith Center for Corporate
Responsibility / ICCR (1972)
• Investor Responsibility Research Center /
IRRC (1972) became IRRC Institute after
2005 sale of IRRC to ISS
• South Shore Bank / Shorebank
(1973)
• National Federation of Community
Development Credit Unions (1974)
• Calvert Social Investment (1976)
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Table 3. ESG in the 1980s and 1990s
‘ESG as a product’
• Dedicated industry networks are formed
in the USA (Ceres, USSIF)
• Triggered by corporate takeovers and
environmental disasters—Exxon Valdez
spill, Bhopal India (Union Carbide)
chemical leak—investors increase their
focus on corporate governance and the
environment
• First social indices launched and universe
of Socially Responsible Investing (SRI)
funds expands
• Advanced business case for sustainability
and reporting (Global Reporting
Initiative—GRI)
• DOL issues guidance that plan fiduciaries
are permitted to consider social benefits
Source: Authors’ calculations

Key institutional developments
• CalPRS, CalSTRS
• US Social Investment Forum / USSIF
(1984)
• Franklin Research & Development (1982)
later renamed Trillium in 1999
• Grameen Bank (1983)
• Self-Help Credit Union (1984)
• Working Assets founded (1985)
• Social Venture Network (1987)
• CERES & the Valdez Principles
(1989)
initially a project of the USSIF
• TIAA Social Choice Account (1990)
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Table 4. Major corporate governance research, service and advocacy organizations
Organization

Est.

Primary Focus
Research, Proxy Voting

Investor
Responsibility
Research Center

IRRC

1972

National Assn of
Corporate Directors

NACD

1977

Council of
Institutional Investors
Institutional
Shareholders Services
International
Corporate
Governance Network
Weinberg Center for
Corporate
Governance
Harvard Law School
Program on
Corporate
Governance
Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate
Governance

Board member practices and
education
Proxy voting, shareholder
resolutions, regulatory advocacy,
engagement, litigation

NonProfit?

Membership/Support

Yes

Subscription

Yes

Corporate directors

Yes

U.S. and non-U.S. pensions,
endowments /foundations,
asset managers

CII

1985

ISS

1985

Proxy voting

No

Fee for advisory service

ICGN

1995

Governance and stewardship
standards and practices

Yes

Pensions, asset managers,
public companies, advisory
services

2000

Discussion forum, teaching,
research

Yes

Law firms, asset managers,
companies

2003

Research, teaching

Yes

Law firms, companies

2006

Discussion forum

Yes

Law firms, companies

Notes
2005 sale to ISS
funded the U
Delaware
Weinberg
Center's IRRCi

Acquired by
MSCI
Primarily North
America and
Europe
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Ira Millstein Center
for Global Markets
and Corporate
Ownership

2012

Teaching, research, discussion
forum

Yes

Law firms, companies

Columbia U. law
school

Arthur and Toni
Stanford U Law
Rembe Rock Center
Teaching, research, discussion
2006
Yes
Law firms, companies
and Business
for Corporate
forum
Schools
Governance
Sources: Source: Authors’ compilations from https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/; https://www.nacdonline.org/;
https://www.cii.org/about; https://www.issgovernance.com/; https://www.icgn.org/; https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/;
https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/; https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/; https://millstein.law.columbia.edu/; https://law.stanford.edu/arthur-andtoni-rembe-rock-center-for-corporate-governance/.
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Table 5. ESG in the 2000s
‘ESG as a process’
• Investors coordinate on climate reporting
issues
• New global investor networks begin to
unite investor approaches from different
regions
• In 2008, the US DOL narrows 1994
guidance: fiduciaries should only rarely
consider non-economic factors when
picking investment options for retirement
plans.
Source: Authors’ calculations

Key Institutional Developments
• Carbon Disclosure Project / CDP (2000)
• UN Global Compact (2000)
• UN Principles for Responsible Investment
(2006)
• Global Impact Investing Network / GIIN
(2009)
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Table 6. UN Principles of Responsible Investment
1. We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making
processes.
2. We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and
practices.
3. We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest.
4. We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment
industry.
5. We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles.
6. We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the Principles.
Source: UN PRI (2021b)
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Table 7. ESG in the 2010s
‘ESG as an outcome’
• ESG investing expands across asset
classes
• Expansion of ESG data and reporting to
better quantify ESG factors
• Greater focus on ‘intentional’ outcomes
and impact measurement
• In 2015, DOL reversed its 2008 guidance,
which ‘unduly discouraged fiduciaries
from considering [economically targeted
investments] and ESG factors’.
• Heightened investor urgency around
climate change as COP 21 establishes the
Paris Agreement, aiming to limit global
warming
• E.U. issues a series of sustainable
investing guidelines and regulations
Source: Authors’ calculations

Key Institutional Developments
• UK Stewardship Code launched (2010)
• Global Initiative for Sustainability Ratings
/ GISR (2011)
• Sustainability Accounting Standards
Board (2011)
• Investment Leaders Group / ILG (2013)
• Japan Stewardship Code launched (2014)
• Taskforce on Climate Related Financial
Disclosure / TCFD (2015)
• UN Sustainable Development Goals /
SDGs (2015/2016)
• Investor Stewardship Group / ISG (2017)
• Impact Management Project (2017)
• International Finance Corporation (IFC)
• Operating Principles for Impact Mgt
(2019)
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Table 8. ESG in the 2020s
‘ESG as a system’
• Expansion of ESG data and reporting
to better quantify ESG factors
• Greater focus on
‘intentional’
outcomes and impact measurement
• COVID-19 and racial equity issues
spur renewed emphasis on ‘S’
• Increased scrutiny and global
regulation to combat ‘greenwashing’
Source: Authors’ calculations

Key Institutional Developments
• Capital Group, TIAA, Blackrock and
other asset managers go ‘all ESG’ (2020)
• U.S. DOL rules that fiduciaries may only
consider financial factors in investing
(2020)
• U.S. DOL announces it will not enforce
the rule (2021)
• EU announces its plan for company ESG
reporting and investor compliance (2021)
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Appendix A: ‘Pre-Modern’ Era in Selected Countries
United States. The Progressive and Depression Eras’ reaction to concentrated wealth and the
negative externalities of industrialization not only resulted in new government social, economic,
and health protections for consumers, small businesses, and employees, such as strong regulatory
agencies and support for strong unions and emergence of pensions. Later, government acted to
require companies to provide pensions and to pay for publicly-managed unemployment insurance.
Notably, this period also produced protections for small shareholders, including major antimonopoly policies, and court decisions that largely eliminated family pyramidal ownership
structures, separated commercial from investment banking and limited the ability of banks,
insurance companies, pensions, and mutual funds to take controlling interest in other companies
(Becht and DeLong 2005). It did not, however, solve the agency problem, as hired managers
directed company activities, with oversight by a board whose members were effectively chosen by
management and approved through votes by dispersed shareholders. By the latter half of the 20th
century, most public companies featured a relatively high degree of managerial control and a
relatively low degree of shareholder influence.
Germany. Worker and shareholder protections as well as social programs began in the late 19th
century in Germany, with Bismarckian legislation establishing the first health insurance, publiclysponsored pensions and unemployment insurance, and union protections. These developments
helped reduce negative externalities borne by workers and their families, and they enabled workers
to band together to negotiate with corporate management. Nevertheless, as in the UK, France and
other countries, these initiatives were not driven by investor actions, but rather by workers
themselves pressuring government and, through unions, companies (Fohlin 2005).
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In contrast, investors were more influential in German corporate governance, as Germany
mandated a form of uniform accounting and reporting rules and a dual corporate board structure
that prohibited overlapping members, features that exist today. However, German banks could still
collect and vote proxies of shareholders of companies underwritten by those banks, and companies
themselves issued additional share classes favoring family control. Consequently, the larger banks
and prominent families controlled an increasing percentage of the German stock market. Notably
and perhaps remarkably, in 1938 a Nazi law was the first in the world to explicitly assign corporate
responsibility to all stakeholders, not just shareholders. However, family owners responded by
shifting away from special share classes to a pyramidal ownership structure (Fohlin 2005). Today,
while diminished, German corporate governance continues to reflect bank and family control of
companies.
United Kingdom. In the UK, early social programs were also the result of worker pressure on
government and, again through unions, on corporations, after the voting franchise was expanded
several times in the 19th century. The original UK corporate structure was through grants of
monopoly from the central government. In the late 19th century, not long after the first shareholder
protections in Germany, UK legislation requiring greater company disclosure and making
company directors liable for prospectus statements were both thought to have influenced a decline
in family ownership of firms while supporting shareholder rights (Franks, Mayer, and Rossi 2005).
Importantly, in the name of employee and consumer protection, government ownership of
prominent industries advanced during WWII and then reversed in the 1980s, with the Thatcher
government’s emphasis on shareholder rather than governmental control. By the late 20th century,
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UK corporate governance came to resemble more closely the US version, with strong management,
a somewhat weaker board, dispersed ownership, and regulatory oversight.
France. With a long history of financial market crises, France relied relatively little on banks and
the stock market as it industrialized. Instead, both France and Italy followed the pattern in Germany
and the UK, where investors were not instrumental in demanding social reforms. Firms tended to
finance new investment largely out of earnings, thus favoring family control, which was further
encouraged through inheritance laws as well as close government connections with family
members. Like the UK, following WWII the French government took controlling interest of major
industries, such as transport, energy, and others, in order to promote employee and consumer
interests. It also established a dual board structure with worker representation on the supervisory
board. As in the UK, the French government later divested some of its industrial holdings, but
maintains some of the strongest worker protections of any industrial country (Murphy 2005).
Italy. Italy’s major banks collapsed in the early 1930s, after which the central government assumed
ownership and separated investment from commercial banking. Similar to the UK and France,
after WWII the government owned and directed investment in capital intensive industries, propped
up failing firms and used industrial policy to support development in southern Italy. It also
supported the rise of family-controlled firms through provision of capital and lack of regulatory
objections. Many family firms remained privately owned, while publicly-traded companies were
family-owned pyramids. By the 1990s, rising debt loads and poor performance among
government-owned firms forced a round of privatization and more dispersed shareholding, giving
rise to demands for better shareholder protections (Aganin and Volpin 2005).
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The Netherlands. The Netherlands has the oldest stock market in the world, but by the 19th century
its development lagged due to hangover from a series of bubbles and crises and French-influenced
aversion to bank financing. As in France, family-owned firms predominated, with financing from
retained earnings. In the 20th century, the use of public shares and long-term bank loans grew as
family dominance gave way to management control. Although Dutch firms are required to have a
two-tier board structure, shareholders had little say in board membership. Moreover, interlocking
directorates, super- and preference-voting shares, income trusts, and other measures reinforced
management control. While workers were not as influential in the Netherlands as in in Germany,
they did have a voice, both in corporate policies and through government worker protections. For
example, industry-based funded pensions proliferated after WWII (CEPS 1995).
Japan. After emerging from self-imposed isolation from the international economic system in the
late 19th century, Japan’s government worked to catch up by funding development of major firms,
which were then consolidated into large family-controlled conglomerates. In the 1930s, the
military took effective control of these firms, but after WWII, the US wrested control away from
government and families to create widespread ownership. However, in response to takeover fears,
Japan’s large public firms developed the system of persistent interlocking cross corporate holdings.
Social benefit programs began for the military at the turn of century, and over the years expanded
to other employment sectors, so that by the 1970s health insurance was universal and retirement
was supported by a combination of public and private insurance. Unions were not a strong force
in this period.

